@InProceedings{	  basin.ea:modeling:2010,
  abstract	= {We present a framework for modeling adversaries in
		  security protocol analysis, ranging from a Dolev-Yao style
		  adversary to more powerful adversaries who can reveal
		  different parts of principals' states during protocol
		  execution. Our adversary models unify and generalize
		  many existing security notions from both the computational
		  and symbolic settings. We extend an existing symbolic
		  protocol-verification tool with our adversary models,
		  resulting in the first tool that systematically supports
		  notions such as weak perfect forward secrecy, key
		  compromise impersonation, and adversaries capable of
		  state-reveal queries. In case studies, we automatically find
		  new attacks and rediscover known attacks that previously
		  required detailed manual analysis.},
  author	= {David Basin and Cas Cremers},
  booktitle	= {Computer Security - ESORICS 2010},
  language	= {USenglish},
  pages		= {340--356},
  publisher	= {Springer},
  series	= {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  title		= {Modeling and Analyzing Security in the Presence of
		  Compromising Adversaries},
  volume	= 6345,
  year		= 2010
}